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Abstract 
Widespread, not well quantified, chain damages from feed crises complicate the task for 
insurers to establish adequate product liability covers for animal feed producers. This paper 
assesses direct and indirect damages for dairy processors and pig and poultry slaughterhouses 
in the Netherlands. Based on expert elicitation, the expected total number of processing sites 
affected during a feed crisis is 15, almost 20%. Assuming publicly available data per type of 
processing industry, expected direct damage in the most likely scenario is Euro 24 million per 
crisis. More detailed figures were obtained through individual company assessments for 
which results are reported as indices (most likely = 100), for reasons of confidentiality. Direct 
damage indices are 100:3:259 for most likely, best case and worst case scenarios 
respectively. In the most likely scenario, 6% of direct damage is traced to products from 
contaminated farms. The remaining 94% is from mixing contaminated products with other 
(intermediate) products during various phases of processing. Indirect damage is on average 
perceived not to exceed direct damage. Scenario results are useful in current stakeholder 
debates on sharing damage burdens of animal feed crises across supply chain partners. 
Key words: Direct damage; Indirect damage; Product liability insurance; Livestock supply 
chains 
1. Introduction 
Animal feed contaminations can cause severe disruptions in livestock supply chains. This 
was for instance the case in the Netherlands in 2002 when pig and cattle feed was found to be 
contaminated with medroxy-progestron-acetaat (MPA). Many feed companies, farms and 
processors became involved and damage was claimed to be around Euro 100 million (Dutch 
Lower House, 2002). In the following years, affected businesses attempted to file claims with 
feed companies but liability issues were hard to solve, among others because of problems of 
identifying responsible feed producers and in demonstrating their guilt. As a consequence, 
only very few damages were indemnified. 
In the course of 2007, following MPA and some other feed crises, processing 
companies started to require animal feed producers to increase their product liability 
insurance covers. The idea of this mainly being that such extended insurance covers would at 
least increase the chance of "proper indemnification" for claimants further along the chain. 
The size of the covers required were Euro 75 million per crisis. In order to press animal feed 
producers to increase their product liability covers, processing companies even stated that 
they would stop processing milk, hogs etc. from livestock farmers who would still buy feed 
from producers who were not able to demonstrate extended insurance cover. For many 
animal feed producers, however, increasing the liability cover proved not to be possible, or 
only at a very high price. Insurance companies were very hesitant in providing extended 
covers, mainly because of the catastrophic nature of the risk and potential problems of 
asymmetric information. At the other hand, also feed producers were not eager to extend their 
insurance. They argued that risks were substantially reduced due to the implementation of a 
series of risk prevention and loss mitigation measures1. Also, they questioned the fairness of 
putting all chain damages on their burden, as the size of damages is also determined by 
processing decisions further along the chain. Following these debates, processors somewhat 
loosened the "Euro 75 million requirement" and rephrased it as "animal feed producers 
should have adequate levels of product liability insurance cover". 
In this framework, there is a strong need for quantitative insight into supply chain 
damage caused by animal feed contaminations. Would, for instance, a cover of Euro 75 
million be "adequate" to cover direct damages of farmers, processors and other partners of 
the chain? Damage figures of recent animal feed crises have not been described very well. 
Also, risk analyses of animal feed contaminations mostly focus on technical issues, see for 
instance Stärk et al. (2002) and damage figures are limited to the feed and farm level (Van 
Asseldonk et al., 2006; Meuwissen et al., 2008). This paper focuses on the so-called post-
harvest part of the chain. More specifically, the objective of this paper is to quantify 
processing companies' direct and indirect damage due to animal feed contamination. 
Although indirect damage is generally not covered by product liability insurance schemes, 
more transparency about the size of this damage is likely to benefit the "fairness and loss 
burden" discussions among chain partners. In the paper, a number of scenarios is evaluated 
for which starting points have been derived from Van Asseldonk et al. (2006). Scenarios are 
for compound feed, which comprises 70% of the total amount of animal feed produced in the 
Netherlands. Processors include dairy processors and pig and poultry slaughterhouses 
operating in the Netherlands. 
2. Daiiy, hog and broiler chains 
1
 These include (1) public initiatives: Regulation 178/2002/EC (General Food Law); Directive 2002/32/EC 
(undesirable substances in animal feed); Commission Decision 2004/217 (prohibited materials for animal 
nutrition); Directive 183/2005/EC (requirements for feed hygiene); (2) sector initiatives: GMP plus HACCP 
(2002); only usage of accredited products based on risk assessment (2003); implementation of procedures for 
recall, early warning and tracking and tracing (2003); and (3) industry initiatives: TrusQ (2003) and SafeFeed 
(2005), which are groups of animal feed producers who aim to further deepen GMP plus HACCP principles. 
Why do insurance companies regard animal feed contaminations as a catastrophic risk? In 
order to understand this, some insight is needed into dairy, hog and broiler chains in the 
Netherlands. First of all, into the production of compound feed itself. Compound feed 
consists of many animal feed ingredients2. This implies that a single contaminated batch can 
be proportioned into multiple compound feed batches, possibly dispersed among many 
compound feed producers. About 100 producers (Table 1) distribute feed to almost 30,000 
farms, who in turn deliver their produce to more than 80 processing sites. Annual turnover of 
these sites ranges from more than Euro 100 million for broiler slaughterhouses to more than 
Euro 300 million for hog slaughterhouses. If something "goes wrong" in any of the stages, 
one can easily imagine that many other stages get involved and damage can be considerable. 
Interrelationships with other livestock chains can even cause multiple chains to become 
affected. Some interrelationships between dairy and pork supply chains are illustrated in 
Figure 1. It is for instance shown that pork processors use lactose from dairy processing as 
part of pork products. 
The Netherlands being an export country further adds to the potential catastrophic 
nature of feed contaminations. The net exporting situation is illustrated by the "degrees of 
self sufficiency" in Table 1. If national production is balanced with national consumption, 
this degree is equal to 100%. The 227% for pigs, for instance, implies that 56%, i.e. 117/227, 
of produce is exported. Export markets, especially countries outside the EU, often react very 
strongly on product contaminations and they might for instance close their border for a 
considerable period of time, thereby causing severe market distortions and price declines for 
Dutch producers. 
2
 For instance, a major type of pig feed consists on average of 2% sugar beet molasses, 4% peas, 4% barley, 3% 
maize products, 5% palm kernels, 10% rapeseed meal, 5% rye, 5% soya bean products, 30% wheat, 2% wheat 
products, 8% wheat feedmeal, 25% triticale and 1% sunflower seed meal. 
Besides "risk factors" also many risk prevention and risk mitigation measures exist. 
For feed producers examples of such measures were mentioned in footnote 1. Similar 
initiatives apply to other stages of the chain. Such measures diminish the chance of feed 
contaminations becoming catastrophic. 
[Table 1] 
[Figure 1] 
3. Damage identification and previous crises 
Damage from crises such as livestock epidemics and food safety crises can be classified into 
direct damage and indirect damage. Although definitions vary somewhat across literature, 
direct damage generally refers to risk mitigation and to the value of destructed livestock and 
contaminated products. Indirect damage mostly refers to less tangible issues such as "price 
impact" and "loss of image". Table 2 shows which direct and indirect damage components 
can occur from animal feed crises across livestock supply chains. Processors, for instance, are 
likely to face direct damage from collecting and destructing intermediate and final products, 
costs of tracking and tracing, and losses from temporary business interruption. Indirect 
damage can occur from widespread product recalls, products being returned by customers, 
decreased demand, and efforts needed to retrieve export markets. 
In our paper, direct and indirect damages are largely defined as in product liability 
insurance schemes, i.e. direct damage refers to contaminated products as well as to products 
mixed with contaminated products, while indirect damage relates to «on-contaminated 
products. Product liability insurance schemes generally cover direct damages; indirect 
damages are mostly excluded. As substantial variety exists in exact definitions of damages 
covered by liability insurance schemes, components listed in Table 2 may not be 
comprehensive. For instance, there can be subtle differences between "collection and 
destruction of contaminated products" and "product recall"; liability policies generally 
consider the first as risk mitigation which is covered by the policy, while for the latter, i.e. the 
wider product recall, separate product recall insurances need to be bought. 
Damage figures from feed crises in the past have not been categorised very well. For a 
number of crises these data are not available at all (bottom part of Table 3). Only MPA-2002 
damage data do distinguish between various chain partners. The more technical data of feed 
crises (upper part of Table 3) show that compound feed was involved in 5 crises (out of 6) 
and that there is considerable variation in the duration of a crisis3. Parameters also show that 
contaminations are mostly notified at farm level. Only for the two most recent crises, i.e. 
bone fragments in 2004 and dioxin in 2006, contaminations were already detected at the feed 
level and processors were not directly involved. 
[Table 2] 
[Table 3] 
4. Materials and methods 
Scenario development 
In defining scenarios to assess processing industries' damage from feed contaminations, key 
variables are number of contaminated farms, type of farms and the number of days during 
which contaminated products are processed. Number and type of farms directly relates to the 
potential amount of produce supplied to processors. For instance, from a slaughterhouse 
perspective, the amount of animals supplied from hog and broiler farms is larger than the 
amounts coming from sow and laying hen farms. For the parameterisation of the variables, 
data from the compound feed risk analysis carried out by Van Asseldonk et al. (2006) were 
taken as a starting point. They found for instance that a feed crisis involves on average 659 
farms, lasts on average for 7 days and is likely to equally affect cattle, pig and poultry sectors. 
3
 Note that the definition of "duration" varies across crises, depending on the data available. For instance in case 
of Dioxin-2003 "duration" (i.e. 23 days) refers to the number of days in which allowable levels were exceeded, 
while for Dioxin-2006 "duration" (i.e. 17 days) covers the whole period from discovering the contamination 
until release of all farms. 
The shorter duration of a crisis (compared to actual lengths of crises as reported in Table 3) 
was attributed to substantial risk reducing effects of prevention and mitigation measures 
lately introduced. 
In our study, mean, 5% and 95% percentiles of farm numbers and crises' duration4 
were interpreted as "most likely", "best case" and "worst case" scenarios for processors 
respectively (Table 4). Farm numbers (1/3 cattle, 1/3 pigs, 1/3 poultry) were further specified 
to subsectors based on relative frequencies, i.e. 91% dairy, 68% hog and 33% broiler farms 
(Agricultural Data, 2007). Crises' duration was interpreted as the number of days during 
which contaminated products are processed. It was furthermore assumed that contaminated 
farms are equally spread across the Netherlands and that produce which is mixed with 
contaminated products is always regarded as being contaminated. Sensitivity analyses were 
defined with regard to the most likely scenario. 
Scenario evaluation 
Direct and indirect damage figures per scenario and what-if analysis were assessed through 
expert elicitation. Figure 2 shows the various assessments made. For contaminated products, 
experts first estimated the number of affected processing sites per crisis from their own 
company perspective. Next, they carried out detailed analyses in order to estimate company-
specific number of batches involved, type and value of products affected and farm-consumer 
lead times. For non-contaminated products, experts assessed potential amounts of returned 
products, decreased demand figures and the costs of efforts needed to retrieve markets. 
Much of the elicited information is confidential. Output is therefore presented in 
various formats. In the "aggregated analysis" of direct damage (Figure 2), the 50%-percentile 
of the elicited number of processing sites is multiplied by the duration of a crisis and the 
4
 Van Asseldonk et al. (2006) developed a stochastic simulation model. Multiple iterations generated 25,000 
possible crisis outcomes. 5% of outcomes was below the 5%-percentile of farms affected and duration of crises 
and 5% of outcomes exceeded the 95%-percentile. 
average turnover per site per day. In this way, output is in absolute numbers (Euro), but part 
of the elicited information, such as number of batches involved, is not used. Moreover, 
assuming the 50%-percentile is overestimating damage in some sectors while 
underestimating it in other sectors. Also, it is implicitly assumed that damage only occurs on 
those days in which contaminated products are being processed and that the complete 
turnover during these days is lost. In contrast, in the "detailed analysis", all elicited expert 
information of direct damage is used, but, for confidentiality reasons, output is presented as 
indices (most likely = 100). Similarly, assessments of indirect damage are as indices, for 
which direct damage = 100. As these assessments were more complex, experts focused on 
most likely and worst case scenarios. 
Experts (n=8) originated from 4 processing companies representing dairy processors 
and pig and poultry slaughterhouses with market shares ranging from 20% to 80% of Dutch 
markets. Experts were consulted in 3 rounds: 2 individual meetings and a plenary session. In 
the plenary session there was group consensus per sector. All meetings took place in autumn 
2007 during which period no animal feed crises occurred. 
[Table 4] 
[Figure 2] 
5. Results 
Number of processing sites affected 
For two sectors involved in our analyses, i.e. "sector 2" and "sector 3", the exact size of a 
feed crisis hardly seems to matter: the expected number of processing sites affected remains 
identical across scenarios and what-if analyses, respectively 3 and 6 (Table 5). For "sector 1" 
however strong differences exist, varying from 2 affected sites in the optimistic scenario to 
15 in the worst case scenario. What-if analyses also show that for all sectors the effect of a 
reduced number of livestock farms involved in a crisis ("less farms") is expected to be larger 
than a reduced number of days in which contaminated products are processed ("less days"). 
For instance, in "sector 1" reducing the number of farms leads to an expected decrease in 
number of processing sites affected from 6 (most likely) to 3 (less farms), while reducing the 
number of days does not reduce the expected number of sites at all. 
Direct damage 
In the "aggregated analysis", total direct damage per crisis ranges from Euro 24 million in the 
most likely scenario to Euro 1 and Euro 105 million in the best case and worst case scenario 
respectively (Table 6). Direct damage is highest for pig slaughterhouses, which relates to 
their relatively high amounts of turnover per day, as was mentioned in Table 1. 
In the "detailed analysis", relative differences between most likely and worst case 
scenarios are much smaller, i.e. for summed direct damages per crisis 100:259, compared to 
Euro 24 million versus Euro 105 million in the "aggregated analysis". In the aggregated 
analysis 15 sites (i.e. 3 sectors x 5 sites per sector) are assumed to encounter "full turnover 
damages" during 30 days, while in the detailed analysis the number of sites is higher (24) but 
sites clearly manage to have not all batches involved. In the worst case scenario, damages 
increase relatively most for dairy processors, i.e. from 100 (most likely) to 358 (worst case). 
Relative differences for slaughterhouses are 100:202 (pig slaughtering) and 100:219 (poultry 
slaughtering). What-if analyses show that, in contrast to our findings for the expected number 
of affected processing sites, the number of days of processing contaminated products does 
significantly impact the size of direct damages in both ways, i.e. when reducing the number 
of days as well as when increasing the number of days. Table 6 (lower part) furthermore 
shows that across the various scenarios and what-if analyses minimally 85% of direct damage 
is expected to be due to the mixing of products during processing. From the total amount of 
produce affected, the percentage already consumed ranges from 2% in the best case scenario 
to 66% in the worst case scenario. 
Indirect damage 
Experts' opinions on indirect damages vary considerably, both with regard to damage 
components applicable as well as with regard to the expected extent of damages (Table 7). 
With regard to the non-contaminated products, "sector 1" expects indirect damage to only 
occur from returned products5. Experts of the other two sectors, however, also expect 
damages due to less demand and due to the need to retrieve (export) markets. In the most 
likely scenario, "sector 1 " and "sector 3" expect indirect damages to be around 26% and 5% 
of direct damage respectively. "Sector 2" expects indirect damages to be about 3 times as 
high as direct damages. Similarly, "sector 2" expects larger damage in the worst case 
scenario. Based on market shares, weighted averages for indirect damage as a percentage of 
direct damage include 34% in the most likely scenario and 105% in the worst case scenario. 
[Table 5] 
[Table 6] 
[Table 7] 
6. Conclusions and future outlook 
Main conclusions 
The catastrophic nature of chain damages from feed crises and the little well specified 
damage data available from previous crises complicate the task for chain partners and 
liability insurers to establish the adequate size of product liability insurance covers for animal 
feed producers. This paper focused on estimating direct and indirect damages for processors 
in livestock supply chains, more specifically dairy processors and pig and poultry 
slaughterhouses in the Netherlands. Main conclusions of the elicitations are as follows: 
(1) In the "aggregated analysis", partly based on public sector data and with straightforward 
assumptions with regard to damage faced, direct damage of processing industries is 
Sector numbers in Table 5 and Table 7 do not necessarily match. 
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estimated to be Euro 24 million in the most likely scenario and Euro 105 million in the 
worst case scenario. In contrast, company-specific expert assessments in the "detailed 
analysis" lead to direct damage indices of 100:259 in the most likely and worst case 
scenario respectively. Clearly, processing companies have ways to manage crises and to 
make extreme situations "less extreme". Insurers need to consider such aspects when 
determining the insured liabilities across chain partners. 
(2) Crucial factors in determining processors' direct damage from feed crises are (i) the 
number of days of actually processing contaminated products; and (ii) the amount of 
products mixed. Increasing the number of "processing days" from 1 and 7 days to 30 days 
(while keeping the number of contaminated farms constant to 659), leads direct damage 
indices to increase from 12 and 100 to 233 respectively. With regard to mixed products, 
results show that across all scenarios and what-if analyses evaluated, minimally 85% of 
direct damage can be attributed to produce mixed with products from contaminated 
farms. These findings imply that premium rates can be lower for those chains which 
transparently minimise the potential number of "processing days" and produce mixed. 
(3) From the various processors considered, differences across scenarios are largest for dairy 
processors. For instance, when comparing the most like and worst case scenario, the 
index of dairy processors' direct damage increases from 100 to 358. For slaughterhouses, 
these differences are 100 and 202 for pig slaughterhouses and 100 and 219 for poultry 
slaughterhouses. For dairy processors however analyses included multiple processing 
stages. 
(4) Feed crises are expected to affect the complete product portfolio of processors, i.e. 
contaminated products (direct damage) as well as non-contaminated products (indirect 
damage). Indirect damage is mostly expected from non-contaminated products being 
returned by customers. The expected size of indirect damages as a percentage of direct 
11 
damages strongly varies across processors. A proper understanding of indirect damage is 
likely to facilitate product liability, i.e. direct damage, pleas. 
(5) Provided insights into direct and indirect damages are useful in current stakeholder 
debates on sharing damage burdens of compound feed contaminations across supply 
chain partners. It however needs to be considered that (i) direct damages for pork and 
chicken processors beyond slaughterhouses, and damages for retailers and consumers 
have not been included; (ii) direct damage figures possibly do not reflect 100% of the 
market as market shares of experts' industries are between 20% and 80%; and (iii) 
juridical issues influencing the eventual size of claims and indemnifications have not been 
considered. 
Future outlook 
Results of this study also highlight issues for further research in the "chain liability arena": 
- Incentives for rapid disclosure. Results show that time is an important factor in 
determining the expected size of processors' direct damage. A rapid disclosure of a feed 
contamination might significantly reduce the size of damages in the chain. Insurance 
companies might therefore design product liability insurance schemes that include "rapid 
disclosure incentives" such as linking the size of indemnity payments to the number of 
livestock farms already supplied with contaminated feed. Similar incentives are in 
practice in risk financing tools for epidemic disease outbreaks, see for instance 
Meuwissen et al. (2006). 
- Crisis liability cover for a group of feed producers. In establishing premium levels, 
insurance companies do not only consider expected damages in the most likely scenario; 
they also assess damages in more extreme cases, i.e. the "maximum estimated loss". As it 
is not likely that each feed producer in the Netherlands is able to cause "a worst case 
scenario", high risk loadings per individual producer likely lead to disproportionate 
12 
premium levels. Crisis covers, i.e. excess covers, for a group of more or less 
homogeneous animal feed producers might be a feasible solution. From January 1, 2006, 
six animal feed producers united under TrusQ (see also footnote 1) have already been 
insured in this way for product liability claims up to Euro 75 million per animal feed 
crisis. 
Definition of risk profiles. Results from this study reflect sector damages. For individual 
rating of feed producers, for instance for establishing excess covers for "homogeneous 
producers" (previous point), more insight is needed into individual risk profiles. Which 
feed producers are more at risk than others and which feed producers are more likely to 
cause extensive chain damages than others? Parameters such as animal feed type 
produced and scale of production seem useful to consider. 
Indemnification schemes for damages due to food safety crises. Recovering direct 
damage from feed crises by filing liability claims often appears to be a long and complex 
procedure. In addition, due to numerous factors, eventual indemnities received are often 
below anticipated levels. In contrast to "hoping for liability claims to be successful", 
indemnification schemes for damage due to food safety issues might be more effective. In 
order to prevent asymmetric information problems, proper design of such schemes is 
needed, including subrogation principles for insurers to be adequately able to recover 
indemnities from liable parties. 
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Table 1 : Farm and processor characteristics of dairy, hog and broiler supply chains1. 
Number of compound feed producers 
Number of farms 
Animals per farm 
Annual production 
Delivery pattern to processors3 
Number of processing companies4 
Number of processing sites4 
Production (1000 ton/year) 
Turnover (mln euro/year) 
Average turnover per site (mln euro/year) 
Degree of self sufficiency5 
Dairy 
22,301 
61 
7,417 kg milk/dairy 
cow 
Once per 
3 days 
15 
50 
11,600 
5,100 
279,452 
Fresh products: 84% 
Cheese: 208% 
Condense: 231% 
Milk powder: 40% 
Hogs 
98 
7,963 
688 
91 kg2/hog 
3.05 hogs/place 
Once per 
2 weeks 
9 
16 
1,283 
1,784 
305,395 
Pork: 227% 
Broilers 
674 
58,394 
2.1 kg2/broiler 
7 broilers/place 
Once per 
7 weeks 
15 
17 
884 
701 
112,973 
Chicken: 161% 
'Sources: Agricultural Data (2007), Agricultural Economic Data (2007), Bunte et al. (2003), Dairy Product 
Board (2007), Quantitative Information Livestock (2007). 
Slaughter weight. 
3Farm-specific patterns depend on among others farm size. 
4For dairy referring to processing activities, for hogs and broilers referring to slaughtering activities. 
'Defined as products produced over products consumed, i.e. percentages > 100% indicate net exports. 
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Table 2: Direct and indirect damage components from feed crises. 
Direct damage1 
Collection and destruction2 
Tracking and tracing 
Business interruption 
Cost of illness 
Indirect damage* 
Product recall3 
Returned products4 
Decreased demand 
Retrieving (export) markets 
Feed 
producers 
X 
X 
X 
-
X 
X 
X 
X 
Farmers 
X 
X 
X 
-
-
-
X 
X 
Processors 
X 
X 
X 
-
X 
X 
X 
X 
Distribution 
channel 
-
X 
X 
-
X 
X 
X 
X 
Consumer 
-
-
-
X 
-
-
-
-
Direct damage relates to contaminated products including mixed products; /«direct damage relates to non-
contaminated products. 
2At the level of feed producers, farmers and processors this includes collection and destruction of feed, livestock 
and livestock products, and intermediate and final products respectively. 
3Refers to recalling «o/?-contaminated products for reasons of restoring customer confidence. 
4During crises, (national and international) customers often return products to their suppliers, even if the 
particular products are not contaminated. 
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Table 3: Recent animal feed crises, type of feed involved, number of farms affected and 
reported damage for food supply chains in the Netherlands1. 
Typeoffeecr2 
Duration (days)3 
Farms affected4 
Notification5 
Products processed 
Reported damage 
(million euro)6 
Feed producers 
Farmers 
Processors 
Other reported 
issues 
Dioxin 
1999 
Compound 
15 
1,821 
Farm 
Yes 
n.a. 
n.a. 
38.5 
Limited 
export 
MPA 
2002 
Compound 
Wet 
59 
685 
Farm 
Yes 
33 
35 
25-50 
Retrieving 
export 
Dioxin 
2003 
Compound 
23 
237 
Feed 
Yes 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Dioxin 
2004 
Wet 
11 
196 
Farm 
Yes 
n.a. 
0.15 
n.a. 
Limited 
export 
Bone 
fragments 
2004 
Compound 
Wet 
16 
0 
Feed 
No 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Dioxin 
2006 
Compound 
17 
275 
Feed 
No 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0.9 
Limited 
export 
"Va^not available. 
2Wet feed includes feed such as wheat starch, brewers' grains, sugar beet pulp, potato cutting and whey. 
3For the various crises, days include Dioxin-1999: days contaminated products were spread throughout the 
chain; MPA-2002: days from first notification of fertility problems until identification of all farms supplied with 
contaminated wet feed (much shorter for other traces); Dioxin-2003: days in which dioxin levels in supplied 
bread meal were proven to be above allowable levels; Dioxin-2004: days from first notification of exceeded 
dioxin limits in milk to identification of the causing factor, i.e. sorting clay; Bone fragments-2004: days from 
first RASFF-notification until enforcement of strict monitoring program; Dioxin-2006: days between discovery 
of contamination and release of farms. 
4Product Board Animal Feed. Dioxin-1999 farms were mostly in Belgium. 
5For the various crises, notification was due to Dioxin-1999: decreased egg production and hatching; MPA-
2002: sow fertility problems; Dioxin-2003: government sampling; Dioxin-2004: regular milk sampling; Bone 
fragments-2004: government sampling (Early Warning System); Dioxin-2006: government sampling. 
Various sources. No distinction between direct and indirect losses. MPA damage originates from Dutch Lower 
House (2002). 
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Table 4: Description of scenarios and what-if analyses. 
Most 
likely 
659 
199 
150 
72 
7 
Scenarios 
Best 
case 
37 
11 
8 
4 
1 
Worst 
case 
2210 
688 
503 
241 
30 
Less 
farms 
37 
11 
8 
4 
7 
What-if 
More 
farms 
2210 
688 
503 
241 
7 
analyses 
Less 
days 
659 
199 
150 
72 
1 
More 
days 
659 
199 
150 
72 
30 
Farms 
- Dairy 
- Hogs 
- Broilers 
Days3 
What-if analyses are with respect to most likely scenario. 
18 
Table 5: Elicited number of processing sites affected by a feed crisis. 
Most 
likely 
6 
3 
6 
15 
5 
Scenarios 
Best 
case 
2 
1 
1 
4 
1 
Worst 
case 
15 
3 
6 
24 
5 
Less 
farms 
3 
2 
2 
7 
2 
What-if analyses 
More 
farms 
10 
3 
6 
19 
5 
Less 
days 
6 
3 
3 
12 
3 
More 
days 
10 
3 
6 
19 
5 
Sector 1 
Sector 2 
Sector 3 
Total per crisis 
50%-percentile 
What-if analyses are with respect to most likely scenario. 
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Table 6: Direct damage for aggregated analysis (million euro) and detailed analysis (index). 
Aggregated analysis 
Dairy processing (mln Euro) 
Pig slaughtering (mln Euro) 
Poultry slaughtering (mln Euro) 
Sum per crisis (mln euro) 
Detailed analysis 
Dairy processing (index) 
Pig slaughtering (index) 
Poultry slaughtering (index) 
Sum per crisis (index)2 
- Contaminated (%) 
- Mixed (%) 
- Correction for products 
already consumed (%) 
Most 
likely 
10 
11 
4 
24 
100 
100 
100 
100 
6 
94 
-16 
Scenarios 
Best 
case 
<1 
<1 
<1 
1 
4 
3 
7 
3 
2 
98 
-2 
Worst 
case 
42 
46 
17 
105 
358 
202 
219 
259 
13 
87 
-66 
Less 
farms 
4 
4 
2 
10 
50 
33 
67 
42 
1 
99 
-19 
What-ifi 
More 
farms 
10 
11 
4 
24 
167 
100 
100 
124 
15 
85 
-17 
jnalys' 
Less 
days 
es1 
1 
1 
<1 
2 
18 
8 
20 
12 
8 
92 
-2 
More 
days 
42 
46 
17 
105 
286 
202 
219 
233 
4 
96 
-64 
What-if analyses are with respect to most likely scenario. 
Corrected for products already consumed. 
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Table 7: Elicited relevance of indirect damage components and size of indirect damage1. 
Most likely scenario 
Sector 1 
Sector 2 
Sector 3 
Sum per crisis2 
Worst case scenario 
Sector 1 
Sector 2 
Sector 3 
Sum per crisis2 
Returned 
products 
Indirect damage components 
Decreased 
demand 
X 
X X 
X X 
X 
X X 
X X 
Retrieving 
(export) markets 
-
X 
X 
-
X 
X 
Indirect damage 
Direct damage = 100 
26 
291 
5 
34 
Direct damage = 100 
46 
531 
99 
105 
^Relevant components are marked with "x". Indirect damage is expressed relative to direct damage. 
2Weighted average of sector indices. Weights are based on market shares. 
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Blood processor 
Hog 
Blood 
Blood 
Meat products 
t 
Meat processor 
I 
Meat products 
ior 1 
Slaughterhouse Meat 
Meat processor 
— T ~ 
Skin and bones J_ Collagen 
Dairy desserts 
Gelatin 
Skin and bone 
processor 
Figure 1 : Illustration of interrelationships in dairy and pork supply chains. 
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Input Scenarios of animal feed crises 
(# farms, # days, sectors) 
Contaminated 
products 
Expert elicitation 
Sector data 
Output 
# processing sites 
Average turnover per 
processing site per day 
I 
Direct damage 
"Aggregated analysis" 
(based on public 
sector data) 
Unit = euro 
I 
Non-contaminated 
products 
# batches affected, 
| products affected, 
• product values, farm-
consumer lead time 
I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
Direct damage 
"Detailed analysis" 
(based on individual 
company assessments) 
Unit = index 
Most likely = 100 
Returned products, I 
decreased demand, | 
retrieving (export) . 
markets ' 
I 
Indirect damage 
"Relative analysis" 
(based on individual 
company assessments) 
Unit = index 
Direct damage = 100 
Figure 2: Types of analyses used to estimate processing industries' damage from feed crises. 
(Dashed boxes indicate confidential figures, bold boxes are reported in this paper.) 
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